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We analytically characterize robustly optimal monetary policy for an aug-
mented New Keynesian model with a housing sector. In our setting, the hous-
ing stock delivers a service ow entering households' utility, houses are durable
goods that depreciate over time, and new houses can be produced using a
concave production technology.
We show that shocks to housing demand and to housing productivity have
\cost-push" implications, which warrant temporary uctuations in the ination
rate under optimal policy, even under an assumption of rational expectations,
for reasons familiar from the literature on \exible ination targeting". How-
ever, under rational expectations optimal monetary policy can still be charac-
terized by commitment to a \target criterion" that refers to ination and the
output gap only, just as in the standard model without a housing sector.
Instead, if policy is to be robust to potential departures of (house price
and ination) expectations from model-consistent ones, the target criterion
must also depend on housing prices. In the empirically realistic case where the
government subsidizes housing, the robustly optimal target criterion requires
the central bank to \lean against" unexpected increases in housing prices, in
the sense that it should adopt a policy stance that is projected to undershoot
its normal targets for ination and/or the output gap owing to the increase
in housing prices, and similarly aim to overshoot those targets in the case of
unexpected declines in housing prices.
We thank Lars Hansen, Mordecai Kurz and Monika Piazzesi for helpful comments, and the Eu-
ropean Research Council (Starting Grant no. 284262) and the Institute for New Economic Thinking
for research support.
1 Introduction
The question of how (if at all) asset price movements should be taken into account
in a central bank's interest-rate policy decisions has been much debated since at
least the 1990s.1 The importance of the issue has become even more evident after the
fallout for the global economy of the recent real estate booms and busts in the US and
several other countries, which at least some attribute to monetary policy decisions
that failed to take account of the consequences for the housing market.2
Yet the issue is not easily addressed using standard frameworks for monetary pol-
icy analysis. One reason is that it is often supposed that large movements in asset
prices are particularly problematic when they are not justied by economic \funda-
mentals," but instead represent mistaken valuations resulting from mistaken expecta-
tions. An analysis that evaluates alternative monetary policies under the assumption
that the outcome resulting from each candidate policy will be a rational-expectations
equilibrium assumes that there can never be any misallocation of resources due to
speculative mispricing of assets, regardless of the monetary policy that is chosen.
Such an analysis will accordingly conclude that there is no need for a central bank to
monitor or respond to signs of such mispricing | but by assuming away the problem.
Some analyses of the question have accordingly allowed for potential departures
of asset prices from \fundamental" values, introducing an expectational error term in
the asset pricing equation that is specied as an exogenous stochastic process (e.g.,
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001)). But conclusions from such analyses depend on
what is assumed about the nature of expectational errors, and not only on what is
assumed about the probability distribution of errors under some given policy (perhaps
the kind of policy that has historically been implemented), but also, crucially on what
is assumed about how the probability distribution of errors would dier under each
alternative policy that may be contemplated. Yet there is little basis for condence
about the correctness of a particular choice in this regard.
Here we propose a dierent approach to the problem. We do not assume that
expectations must necessarily be model-consistent, but we do not assume that ex-
pectational errors must be of any specic type that can be predicted in advance,
either; rather, we associate with any contemplated policy a set of possible probability
beliefs, that includes all possible (internally coherent) probability beliefs that are not
too dierent from those predicted by one's model, in the case of that policy and those
beliefs. This is the hypothesis of \near-rational expectations" [NRE] introduced in
Woodford (2010)
This makes the set of possible private-sector beliefs contemplated by the policy
analysis dependent on the particular policy that is adopted, as in the case of the
rational expectations hypothesis. In particular, beliefs are treated as possible if it
1See, for example, Bernanke and Gilchrist (1999, 2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Christiano
et al. (2010)
2For example, Taylor (2007) or Adam, Marcet and Kuang (2011).
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would not be too easy to disconrm them using observed data from the equilibrium
of the model, and whether this is so will depend on policy. But the set of beliefs that
are considered will include ones that result in asset valuations dierent from the ones
that will be judged correct according to the policy analyst's model; hence the policy
analyst will consider the possibility of equilibria in which assets are mis-priced, and
will therefore consider the consequences of responding to such asset price movements
in dierent ways.
Because the set of possible \near-rational" beliefs associated with any given pol-
icy includes many elements, analysis of the kind proposed here will not associate a
single predicted path for the economy (contingent on the realized values of exogenous
shocks) with a given policy. It may therefore be wondered how welfare comparisons
of alternative policies are possible. Our proposal, in the spirit of the robust policy
analysis of Hansen and Sargent (2008), is to choose a policy that achieves the highest
possible lower bound for expected utility of the representative household, across all
of the equilibria with \near-rational" expectations consistent with that policy. We
call a solution to this problem a \robustly optimal" policy rule.
We wish to consider the problem of robustly optimal policy within as broad a class
of possible policy rules as possible; in particular, we do not wish to prejudge questions
such as the way in which the policy rule may involve systematic response to housing-
related variables or to indicators of market expectations. Our earlier paper (Adam
and Woodford (2012)) shows how it is possible to characterize robustly optimal policy
rules without restricting oneself a priori to some simple parametric family of policy
rules. The basic idea (reviewed in more detail in section 2) is that we can derive
an upper bound for the maximin level of welfare that is potentially achievable under
any policy rule, without reference to any specic class of policy rules; if we can then
display examples of policy rules that achieve this upper bound, we know that these
are examples of robustly optimal policies. We show here that this method can be
applied to a New Keynesian DSGE model with endogenous housing supply.
We are especially interested in a particular way of specifying the policy rule, in
which the central bank commits itself to fulll a quantitative target criterion at all
times.3 Under this commitment it uses its policy instrument at each point in time
as necessary in order to ensure that the paths of various endogenous variables satisfy
the relationship specied by the target criterion. In a basic New Keynesian model
without a housing sector and under the assumption of rational expectations, it is
well-known that an optimal policy commitment can be characterized in these terms;
the required target criterion is a \exible ination targeting" rule in the sense of
3The robustly optimal policy rule is not unique, as is discussed in more detail in Adam and
Woodford (2012). Dierent rules may be consistent with the same worst-case NRE equilibrium
dynamics, and so achieve the same lower bound for expected utility, without being equivalent,
either in terms of the out-of-equilibrium behavior that they would require from the central bank,
or in terms of the boundaries of the complete set of NRE equilibria consistent with the policy in
question.
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Svensson (1999), in which short-run departures from the long-run ination target are
justied precisely to the extent that they are proportional to short-run variations in
the rate of change of an \output gap" variable.4 Here we show that a generalization
of this criterion can be used to implement robustly optimal policy in our model with
a housing sector and allowance for non-model-consistent beliefs. We show, however,
that the robustly optimal target criterion must involve housing prices, as well as
ination (or the price level) in the non-housing sector and the output gap.
In the empirically realistic case in which housing is subsidized by the government,
and is therefore supplies to excess in equilibrium, the robustly optimal target criterion
requires the central bank to "lean against" unexpected increases in housing prices.
By this we mean that it should adopt a policy stance that is projected to result in
smaller increases in ination and/or the output gap than would be chosen in the
absence of the surprise increase in housing prices; thus requires a "tighter" monetary
policy than would otherwise be chosen. Similarly, it should aim for larger increases
in ination and or the output gap in the case of an unexpected decline in housing
prices.
The policy of "leaning against" housing price increases is more robust than a cor-
respondingly exible ination targeting rule that ignores housing price variations (and
that would be optimal under rational expectations), in the sense that the distorted
expectations that would lead to the worst possible outcome under this policy (among
all possible beliefs that comply with a certain bound on the possible size of belief dis-
tortions) do not lower welfare as much as some possible beliefs distortions (consistent
with the same bound on the size of distortions) would under the conventional policy.
The degree to which the robustly optimal policy requires "leaning against" housing
prices increases depends, however, on model parameters. Notably, it depends both
on the size of the housing subsidy and on the price elasticity of housing supply, as
discussed further below.
Our linear approximation to the robustly optimal policy commitment can also be
derived as the solution to a robust linear-quadratic policy problem. In this problem,
the central bank's quadratic loss function has three terms, representing three com-
peting stabilization objectives: ination stabilization, output-gap stabilization, and
minimization of the variance of surprises in a composite variable that includes both
ination and housing prices. It is this additional stabilization objective, that appears
only due to a concern for robustness and that requires housing prices to enter the
robustly optimal target criterion.
Section 2 denes robustly optimal policy and presents the general approach that
we use to characterize it. Section 3 then presents our New Keynesian monetary
DSGE model with a housing sector, and denes an equilibrium with possibly distorted
private sector expectations, generalizing the standard concept of rational-expectations
equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 characterize equilibrium dynamics in the case of a
policy that achieves the highest possible lower bound for welfare of the representative
4See, for example, chapter 7 in Woodford (2003).
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household, for a given bound on the possible size of belief distortions. Section 6 then
derives a target cirterion that can implement this outcome, i.e., that achieves this
highest lower bound for all belief distortions subject to the bound, and shows that it
has the properties summarized above. Section 7 further discusses the reasons for our
results, in terms of the implications of a linear-quadratic stabilization problem that
approximates the exact problem solved in sections 4 and 5. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Policy Problem in General Terms
This section describes the general approach that we use to characterize robustly
optimal policy. These general ideas are then applied to a New Keynesian model with
a housing sector in section 3.
2.1 Robustly Optimal Policy
Consider a policymaker who cares about some vector x of endogenous economic out-
comes in the sense of seeking to achieve as high a value as possible for some (welfare)
objective W (x). The value of x depends both on policy and on forward-looking pri-
vate sector decisions, which in turn depend on the private-sector's belief distortions as
parameterized by some vector m. Among the determinants of x is a set of structural
economic equations, typically involving rst-order conditions of private agents and
market clearing conditions, that we write as
F (x;m) = 0: (1)
We assume that the equations (1) are insucient to completely determine the vector
x, under given belief distortions m, so that the policymaker faces a non-trivial choice.
Let us suppose that the policymaker must choose a policy commitment c from
some set C of feasible policy commitments. Our results about robustly optimal policy
do not depend on the precise specication of the set C; for now, we simply assume that
there exists such a set, but we make no specic assumption about what its boundaries
may be. We only impose two general assumptions about the nature of the set C: rst,
we assume that each of the commitments in the set C can be dened independently of
what the belief distortions may be5; and second, we shall require that for any c 2 C,
there exists an equilibrium outcome for any choice of m 2 M . The latter assigns to
the policymaker the responsibility for insuring existence of equilibrium for arbitrary
belief distortions.
Given our general requirements, the set C may include many dierent types of
policy commitments. For example, it may involve policy commitments that depend
5As is made more specic in the application below, we specify policy commitments by equations
involving the endogenous and exogenous variables, but not explicitly the belief distortions. Of
course, the endogenous variables referred to in the policy commitment will typically also be linked
by structural equations that involve the belief distortions.
4
on the history of exogenous shocks; commitments that depend on the history of
endogenous variables, as is the case with Taylor rules; and commitments regarding
relationships between endogenous variables, as is the case with so-called targeting
rules. Also, the endogenous variables in terms of which the policy commitment is
expressed may include asset prices (futures prices, forward prices, etc.) that are
often treated by central banks as indicators of private-sector expectations, as long
as the requirement is satised that the policy commitment must be consistent with
belief distortions of an arbitrary form.
In order to dene the robustly optimal decision problem of the policymaker, we
further specify an outcome function that identies the equilibrium outcome x associ-
ated with a given policy commitment c 2 C and a given belief distortion m.
Denition 1 The economic outcomes associated with belief distortions m and com-
mitments c are given by an outcome function
O :M  C ! X
with the property that for all m 2 M and c 2 C, the outcome O(m; c) and m jointly
constitute an equilibrium of the model. In particular, the outcome function must
satisfy
F (O(m; c);m) = 0
for all all m 2M and c 2 C.
Here we have not been specic about what we mean by an \equilibrium," apart from
the fact that (1) must be satised. In the context of the specic model presented
in the next section, equilibrium has a precise meaning. For purposes of the present
discussion, it does not actually matter how we dene equilibrium; only the denition
of the outcome function matters for our subsequent discussion.6
To complete the description of the robustly optimal policy problem, letM denote
the set of all possible belief distortions and V (m)  0 a measure of the size of the
belief distortions. We assume that V (m) is equal to zero only in the case of beliefs
that agree precisely with those of the policymaker and that V (m) is strictly increasing
in the 'size of the distortions'. The functional form for V (m) ultimately reects our
conception of 'near-rational expectations'. Section 2.2 introduces a specic functional
form that is based on a relative entropy measure.
The robustly optimal policy problem can then be represented as a choice of a






W (O(m; c)) s.t. V (m)  V

(2)
6If the set of equations (1) is not a complete set of requirements for x to be an equilibrium, this
only has the consequence that the upper-bound outcome dened below might not be a tight enough
upper bound; it does not aect the validity of the assertion that it provides an upper bound.
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where V  0 measures the policymaker's degree of concern for robustness. For the
special case with V = 0 the robustly optimal policy problem reduces to a standard
optimal policy problem with model-consistent private sector expectations. As V
increases, the policymaker becomes concerned with increasingly larger deviations of
private sector expectations from those that would be consistent with its own model
used for policy analysis.
Let cR denote the robustly optimal policy commitment and mR the associated
worst-case beliefs, i.e., the solution to the inner problem in (2). Suppose there exists
a Lagrange multiplier   0 such that mR also solves
min
m2M
W (O(m; cR)) + V (m)





W (O(m; c)) + V (m) (3)
where  now parameterizes the concern for robustness. Let the resulting values for










W (x) + V (m) (4)
s:t: : F (x;m) = 0;
which allows us to determine the robustly optimal policy commitment as follows:
rst, we determine the optimal choices x and m solving the problem on the right-
handside of (4). In a second step, we look for a policy-commimtment ec and a belief
disortion em such that em solves
min
m2M
W (O(m;ec)) + V (m)
and for which W (O(em;ec)) + V (em) = W (x) + V (m). Since W (x) + V (m)
represents an upper bound on what robustly optimal policy can achieve, see (3), no
other policy commitment can achieve a better outcome, ec indeed represents an optimal
policy commitment, independently of the specic class C of policy commitments
considered (as long as our two general requirements on the class C hold).
2.2 Distorted Private Sector Expectations
We next discuss our approach to the parameterization of belief distortions, and the
distortion measure V (m): At this point it becomes necessary to specify that our
analysis concerns dynamic models in which information is progressively revealed over
time, at a countably innite sequence of successive decision points.
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Let (
;B;P) denote a standard probability space with 
 denoting the set of pos-
sible realizations of an exogenous stochastic disturbance process f0; 1; 2; :::g, B the
 algebra of Borel subsets of 
; and P a probability measure assigning probabili-
ties to any set B 2 B. We consider a situation in which the policy analyst assigns
probabilities to events using the probability measure P but fears that the private
sector may make decisions on the basis of a potentially dierent probability measure
denoted by bP .
We let E denote the policy analyst's expectations induced by P and bE the cor-
responding private sector expectations associated with bP . A rst restriction on the
class of possible distorted measures that the policy analyst is assumed to consider
| part of what we mean by the restriction to \near-rational expectations" | is
the assumption that the distorted measure bP, when restricted to events over any
nite horizon, is absolutely continuous with respect to the correspondingly restricted
version of the policy analyst's measure P.
The Radon-Nikodym theorem then allows us to express the distorted private sector
expectations of some t+ j measurable random variable Xt+j as
bE[Xt+jjt] = E[Mt+jMt Xt+jjt]
for all j  0 where t denotes the partial history of exogenous disturbances up to pe-
riod t. The random variableMt+j is the Radon-Nikodym derivative, and completely
summarizes belief distortions.7 The variable Mt+j is measurable with respect to the
history of shocks t+j, non-negative and is a martingale, i.e., satises
E[Mt+jj!t] =Mt




one step ahead expectations based on the measure bP can be expressed as
bE[Xt+1jt] = E[mt+1Xt+1jt];
where mt+1 satises
E[mt+1jt] = 1 and mt+1  0: (5)
This representation of the distorted beliefs of the private sector is useful in dening
a measure of the distance of the private-sector beliefs from those of the policy analyst.
As discussed in Hansen and Sargent (2005), the relative entropy
Rt = Et[mt+1 logmt+1]
7See Hansen and Sargent (2005) for further discussion.
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is a measure of the distance of (one-period-ahead) private-sector beliefs from the
policymaker's beliefs with a number of appealing properties.
We wish to extend this measure of the size of belief distortions to an innite-
horizon economy with a stationary structure. In the kind of model with which we
are concerned, the policy objective in the absence of a concern for robustness is of
the form






for some discount factor 0 <  < 1; where U() is a time-invariant function, and xt
is a vector describing the real allocation of resources in period t. Correspondingly,
we propose to measure the overall degree of distortion of private-sector beliefs by a
discounted criterion of the form






as in Woodford (2010). This is a discounted sum of the one-period-ahead distortion
measures fRtg: We assign relative weights to the one-period-ahead measures Rt for
dierent dates and dierent states of the world in this criterion that match those
of the other part of the policy objective (6). Use of this cost function implies that
the policymaker's degree of concern for robustness (relative to other stabilization
objectives) remains constant over time, regardless of past history.
3 A Sticky Price Model with a Housing Sector
We shall begin by deriving the exact structural relations describing a New Keynesian
model featuring a long-lived asset and potentially distorted private sector expecta-
tions. The existing stock of assets is assumed to generate a service ow that directly
enters agents' utility. Assets depreciate over time but can be produced using a tech-
nology with decreasing returns to scale. For convenience we interpret the long-lived
asset as housing, though other interpretations are possible.
The model is completely standard, except for the presence of the long-lived asset
and the fact that the private sector holds potentially distorted expectations. The
exposition here extends the framework of Adam and Woodford (2011), who write the
exact structural relations for a simpler model without a housing sector.
3.1 Model Structure
The economy is made up of identical innite-lived households, each of which seeks to
maximize











subject to a sequence of ow budget constraints8
PtCt +Bt + (Dt + (1  )Dt 1) qtPt + ktPt
 (1 + sd) ~d(kt; t)qtPt +
Z 1
0
wt(j)PtHt(j)dj +Bt 1(1 + it 1) + t + Tt;
where bE0 is the common distorted expectations held by consumers conditional on
the state of the world in period t0, Ct an aggregate consumption good which can be
bought at nominal price Pt; Ht(j) is the quantity supplied of labor of type j and
wt(j) the associated real wage, Dt the stock of durable assets or houses,  2 [0; 1] the
housing depreciation rate, qt the real price of houses, kt investment in new houses
and ~d(kt; t) the resulting production of new houses, s
d a government subsidy (which
may be positive or negative) applied to the value of newly produced houses, Bt
nominal bond holdings, it the nominal interest rate, and t is a vector of exogenous
disturbances, which may induce random shifts in the functions ~u, ~v, ~! and ~d. The
variable Tt denotes lump sum taxes levied by the government and t prots accruing
to households from the ownership of rms.
The aggregate consumption good is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of

































where ~;  > 0; ~ 2 (0; 1) and f Ct; Ht; dt ; Adtg are bounded exogenous and positive
disturbance processes which are among the exogenous disturbances included in the
vector t. Our specication includes two housing related disturbances that will be
of particular interest for our analysis, namely dt which captures shocks to housing
preferences and Adt shocks to the productivity in the construction of new houses. We
8We abstract from state-contingent assets in the household budget constraint because the repre-
sentative agent assumption implies that in equilibrium there will be no trade in these assets.
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impose linearity in the utility function (12) as this greatly facilitates the analytical
characterization of optimal policy.
Each dierentiated good is supplied by a single monopolistically competitive
producer; there is a common technology for the production of all goods, in which
(industry-specic) labor is the only variable input,
yt(i) = Atf(ht(i)) = Atht(i)
1=; (14)
where At is an exogenously varying technology factor, and  > 1. The Dixit-Stiglitz







where Yt is the total demand for the composite good dened in (9), pt(i) is the









corresponding to the minimum cost for which a unit of the composite good can be
purchased in period t. Total demand is given by
Yt = Ct + kt + gtYt; (17)
where gt is the share of the total amount of composite good purchased by the gov-
ernment, treated here as an exogenous disturbance process.
3.2 Household Optimality Conditions
Each household maximizes utility by choosing state contingent sequences fCt; Ht(j); Dt; kt; Btg
taking as given the process for fPt; wt(j); qt; it;t; Ttg. The rst order conditions give





a consumption Euler equation
~uC(Ct; t) =  bEt ~uC(Ct+1; t+1)1 + itt+1

; (19)
9In addition to assuming that household utility depends only on the quantity obtained of Ct; we
assume that the government also cares only about the quantity obtained of the composite good de-
ned by (9), and that it seeks to obtain this good through a minimum-cost combination of purchases
of individual goods.
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and an asset pricing equation
qut = 
d








is the market valuation of housing in period t, expressed in marginal-utility units.
The variable qut provides a measure of whether housing is currently expensive or
inexpensive, in units that are particularly relevant for determining housing demand.
More importantly, because of (21), it is expectations about the future value of quT ,
rather than the future value of qT as such, that inuence the current market value of
housing, so that the degree of distortion that may be present in expectations regarding
the former variable is of particular importance for equilibrium determination. The
housing-price variable qut is accordingly of particular interest.
Equations (18)-(21) jointly characterize optimal household behavior under dis-






















is a term that depends on exogenous shocks and belief distortions only.
3.3 Optimal Price Setting by Firms
The producers in each industry x the prices of their goods in monetary units for a
random interval of time, as in the model of staggered pricing introduced by Calvo
(1983) and Yun (1996). Let 0   < 1 be the fraction of prices that remain unchanged
in any period. A supplier that changes its price in period t chooses its new price pt(i)




T ; PT ;YT ; q
u
T ; T ); (25)
where bEt is the distorted expectations of price setters conditional on time t informa-
tion, which are assumed identical to the expectations held by consumers, Qt;T is the
stochastic discount factor by which nancial markets discount random nominal in-
come in period T to determine the nominal value of a claim to such income in period
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t, T t is the probability that a price chosen in period t will not have been revised
by period T , and the function (pt(i); : : :) indicates the nominal prots of the rm
in period t (discussed further below). In equilibrium, the discount factor is given by
Qt;T = 





Prots are equal to after-tax sales revenues net of the wage bill. Sales revenues are







Here  t is a proportional tax on sales revenues in period t; f tg is treated as an
exogenous disturbance process, taken as given by the monetary policymaker. We
assume that  t uctuates over a small interval around a non-zero steady-state level  .
We allow for exogenous variations in the tax rate in order to include the possibility
of \pure cost-push shocks" that aect equilibrium pricing behavior while implying no
change in the ecient allocation of resources.
The real wage demanded for labor of type j is given by equation (18) and rms
are assumed to be wage-takers. Because the right-hand side of (23) is a monotonically
increasing function of Ct, (23) implies the existence of a dierentiable function
Ct = C(Yt; q
u
t ; t) (27)
solving (23) with the derivative CY satisfying 0 < CY (Yt; q
u
t ; t) < 1   g. Using
this function and the assumed functional forms for preferences and technology, the





























!  (1 + )  1 > 0
is the elasticity of real marginal cost in an industry with respect to industry output.
Subtracting the nominal wage bill from the above expression for nominal after tax
revenue, we obtain the function (pt(i); p
j
T ; PT ;YT ; q
u
T ; T ) used in (25). The vector
of exogenous disturbances t now includes At; gt and  t, in addition to the shocks





Each of the suppliers that revise their prices in period t chooses the same new price
pt ; that maximizes (25). Note that supplier i's prots in (25) are a concave function of
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the quantity sold yt(i); since revenues are proportional to yt(i)
 1
 and hence concave
in yt(i), while costs are convex in yt(i). Moreover, since yt(i) is proportional to
pt(i)
 ; the prot function is also concave in pt(i) . The rst-order condition for the
optimal choice of the price pt(i) is the same as the one with respect to pt(i)
 ; hence





T ; PT ;YT ; q
u
T ; T ) = 0;
is both necessary and sucient for an optimum. The equilibrium choice pt (which
is the same for each rm in industry j) is the solution to the equation obtained by




t into the above rst-order condition.











where Ft and Kt capture the eects of discounted marginal costs and revenues, re-
spectively, and are dened by
Ft  bEt 1X
T=t






Kt  bEt 1X
T=t







f(Y; qu; )  (1  ) C ~ 1Y C(Y; qu; ) e 1 ; (31)





Relations (29){(30) can also be written in the recursive form
Ft = f(Yt; q
u
t ; t) +  bEt[ 1t+1Ft+1] (33)
Kt = k(Yt; t) +  bEt[(1+!)t+1 Kt+1]; (34)
where t  Pt=Pt 1:10 The price index then evolves according to a law of motion
Pt =

(1  )p1 t + P 1 t 1
 1
1  ; (35)
10It is evident that (29) implies (33); but one can also show that processes that satisfy (33) each
period, together with certain bounds, must satisfy (29). Since we are interested below only in the
characterization of bounded equilibria, we can omit the statement of the bounds that are implied by
the existence of well-behaved expressions on the right-hand sides of (29) and (30), and treat (33){
(34) as necessary and sucient for processes fFt;Ktg to measure the relevant marginal conditions
for optimal price-setting.
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as a consequence of (16). Substitution of (28) into (35) implies that equilibrium









Equations (33), (34) and (36) jointly dene a short-run aggregate supply relation
between ination, output and house prices, given the current disturbances t; and
(potentially distorted) expectations regarding future ination, output, house prices
and disturbances.
3.4 Summary and Equilibrium Denition
For the subsequent analysis it will be helpful to express the model in terms of the
endogenous variables (Yt; Kt; Ft;t; q
u
t ;mt; it) only, where mt is the belief distortions









a measure of price dispersion at time t. The vector of exogenous disturbances is given
by t =
 







We begin by expressing expected household utility (evaluated under the objective
measure P) in terms of these variables. Inverting the production function (14) to
write the demand for each type of labor as a function of the quantities produced of
the various dierentiated goods, it is possible to write the utility of the representative

















t ; t)  ~u(C(Yt; qut ; t); t)
v(yjt ; t)  ~v(f 1(yjt=At); t)
where in this last expression we make use of the fact that the quantity produced of
each good in industry j will be the same, and hence can be denoted yjt ; and that the
quantity of labor hired by each of these rms will also be the same, so that the total
demand for labor of type j is proportional to the demand of any one of these rms.
One can furthermore express the relative quantities demanded of the dierentiated
goods each period as a function of their relative prices, using (15). This and the linear
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dependence of utility on the stock of assets allows us to write the utility ow to the
representative household in the form
u(Yt; q
u










Et[(1  )T t T tdT ]: (38)
We can use (20), (22) and (27) to express kt in terms of Yt, q
u
t and exogenous shocks.






t ; t): (39)
where the explicit expression for the ow utility is given by
U(Yt;t; q
u































which is a a monotonically decreasing function of  given Y , qu and  and where

(qut ; t) is the function dened in (24).
The consumption Euler equation (19) can be expressed as
~uC(C(Yt; q
u









Using (36) to substitute for the variable t equations (33) and (34) can be expressed
as
Ft = f(Yt; q
u
t ; t) + Et [mt+1F (Kt+1; Ft+1)] (42)
Kt = k(Yt; q
u
t ; t) + Et [mt+1K(Kt+1; Ft+1)] ; (43)
where the functions F ; K are both homogeneous degree 1 functions of K and F .
Because the relative prices of the industries that do not change their prices in
period t remain the same, one can use (35) to derive a law of motion for the price
dispersion term t of the form
t = h(t 1;t); (44)
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where







This is the source of welfare losses from ination or deation. Using once more (36)
to substitute for the variable t one obtains
t = ~h(t 1; Kt=Ft): (45)
The asset pricing equation (21) and equations (41)-(45) represent ve constraints on
the equilibrium paths of the seven endogenous variables (Yt; Ft; Kt;t; q
u
t ;mt+1; it).
For a given sequence of belief distortions mt satisfying restriction (5) there is thus
one degree of freedom left, which can be determined by monetary policy. We are now
in a position to dene the equilibrium with distorted private sector expectations:
Denition 2 (DEE) A distorted expectations equilibrium (DEE) is a bounded stochas-
tic process for fYt; Ft; Kt;t; qut ;mt+1; itg1t=0 satisfying equations (5), (21) and (41)-
(45).
4 Upper Bound in the Model with Housing
We shall now formulate the upper bound problem on the right-hand side of (4) for the
nonlinear New Keynesian model with a housing market and distorted private sector




















t ; t) + mt+1(Zt+1)  Zt]
+	t[
d
t + (1  )mt+1qut+1   qut ]
+ t (mt+1   1)
3777775 (46)
+  0 1(Z0) + 	 1(1  )qu0 ;

















11From the constraint (21) follows that the choice of fmt+1g1t=0 and the exogenous shocks jointly
determine fqut g1t=0. Therefore, worst case beliefs eectively determine the minimizing sequence for
fmt+1; qut g1t=0.
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and added the initial pre-commitments  0 1(Z0) + 	 1(1  )qu0 to obtain a time-
invariant solution. The Lagrange multiplier vector  t is associated with constraints
(42) and (43) and given by  0t = ( 1t; 2;t). The multiplier t relates to equation
(45), the multiplier 	t to equation (21) and the multiplier  t to constraint (5). We
also eliminated the interest rate and the constraint (41) from the problem. Under
the assumption that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is not binding,
constraint (41) imposes no restrictions on the path of the other variables.12 The path
for the nominal interest rates can thus be computed ex-post using the solution for
the remaining variables and equation (41).
The nonlinear FOCs for the policymaker are then given by
UY (Yt;t; q
u













   2t + mt 0t 1D2(Kt=Ft) = 0 (50)
U(Yt;t; q
u
t ; t)  t + Et[t+1~h1(t; Kt+1=Ft+1)] = 0 (51)
for all t  0. The nonlinear FOC for the worst-case belief distortions mt+1 and the
FOC for qut take the form
(logmt+1 + 1) +  
0
t(Zt+1) + (1  )	tqut+1 +  t = 0 (52)
Uq(Yt;t; q
u




t ; t) + 	t 1(1  )mt  	t = 0 (53)
for all t  0. Above, ~hi(; K=F ) denotes the partial derivative of ~h(; K=F ) with
respect to its i-th argument, and Di(K=F ) is the i-th column of the matrix
D(Z) 





Since the elements of (Z) are homogeneous degree 1 functions of Z, the elements of
D(Z) are all homogenous degree 0 functions of Z, and hence functions of K=F only.
Thus we can alternatively write D(K=F ). The optimal upper-bound dynamics are
then bounded stochastic processes fYt; Ft; Kt;t; qut ;mt+1g that satisfy the structural
equation (5), (21), (42)-(45) and the rst order conditions (48)-(53).
5 Optimal Upper Bound Dynamics
We shall be concerned solely with optimal outcomes that involve small uctua-
tions around a deterministic optimal steady state. An optimal steady state is a
12This assertion also depends on our assumption here that the central bank chooses its interest-rate
operating target it with full information about the state of the economy at date t.
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set of constant values (Y ; Z;; qu;m; ; ;	;  ) that solve the structural equations
(5),(21),(42)-(45) and the FOCs (48)-(53) in the case that t =  at all times and
initial conditions consistent with the steady state are assumed. We now compute the
steady-state, then derive the local dynamics implied by these equations.
5.1 The Optimal Steady State and Its Properties
In a deterministic steady state, restriction (5) implies m = 1. Equation (21) then
implies qu = 
d
. Moreover, as in the model without housing, considered in Adam
and Woodford (2012), the optimal steady state satises F = K = (1 ) 1k(Y ; ),
which implies  = 1 (no ination) and  = 1 (zero price dispersion), where the value
of Y is implicitly dened by
f(Y ; qu; ) = k(Y ; ): (55)
As shown in appendix A.1, there exists a unique steady state consumption level Y
solving (55).
Furthermore, with ~h2(1; 1) = 0 (the eects of a small non-zero ination rate on
the measure of price dispersion are of second order), conditions (49){(50) reduce in
the steady state to the eigenvector condition
 0 =  0D(1): (56)
Moreover, since when evaluated at a point where F = K;
@ log(K=F )
@ logK






we observe that D(1) has a left eigenvector [1   1]; with eigenvalue 1=; hence (56)
is satised if and only if  2 =   1: Condition (48) provides then one additional
condition to determine  1. It implies
UY (Y ; 1; q
u; ) +  1(fY (Y ; q
u; )  kY (Y ; qu; )) = 0: (57)
Appendix A.1 shows that
kY   fY > 0;
so that  1 has the same sign as UY . Appendix A.1 also proves that
UY (Y ; 1; q




Y ; qu; 







Y ; qu; 





which shows that in the absence of a housing subsidy (sd = 0) we have UY = 0
and thus  1 = 0, whenever the output subsidy eliminates the steady state monopoly
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distortion, i.e., when 1    =  1  g 
 1 . The resulting steady state consumption
level is then determined by (98) in appendix A.1.
More generally, we shall consider the case with a non-zero housing subsidy/tax.
Conditional on the value of housing subsidy sd one can then dene an ecient steady
state output subsidy  eff (sd), which is the value of  such that UY = 0 in (58).
Appendix A.2 shows the following result:
Lemma 1 If sd  0, or if sd < 0 but suciently close to zero, then UY Y < 0.
The previous lemma shows that  eff (sd) indeed maximizes steady state utility in
the presence of a housing subsidy or a housing tax that is not too large. Appendix
A.1 then establishes the following result:
Lemma 2 Given a housing subsidy sd and the ecient output subsidy 1    = 1  
 eff (sd), we have
UY =  1 = 0:
If the output subsidy falls short of its ecient value, 1   < 1   eff (sd), then
UY > 0,  1 > 0;
while if instead 1   > 1   eff (sd) one obtains
UY < 0,  1 < 0:
The previous lemma shows that the marginal utility of output is positive (neg-
ative) in the steady state, whenever the output subsidy falls short of (exceeds) the
output subsidy that would be ecient given the assumed level of housing subsidies.
Condition (51) provides a restriction that determines the steady state value of  :
U(Y ; 1; q
u; )   + ~h1(1; 1) = 0:
Since U < 0 and ~h1(1; 1) = , we have
 =
U(Y ; 1; q
u; )











and appendix A.3 proves the following result:
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Lemma 3 If sd = 0, Uq(Y; 1; q
u; ) = 0. If instead sd > 0, Uq < 0, and if s
d < 0,
Uq > 0. Then since  1 = 0 if  = 
eff (sd), it follows that
	 = 0 if sd = 0 and  =  eff (0)
	 < 0 if sd > 0;  suciently close to  eff (sd)
	 > 0 if sd < 0,  suciently close to  eff (sd)
The previous lemma shows that for a positive housing subsidy, the representative
household's utility is decreasing with further house price increases, whenever the out-
put subsidy is suciently close to its ecient level. Correspondingly, in the presence
of a housing tax, houshold utility decreases with a fall in housing prices. Intuitively,
holding the level of total output Y xed, an increase in the housing price leads to a
further increase in housing investment, which is already ineciently high (low) when
there is a housing subsidy (tax).
5.2 Characterizing the Upper Bound Dynamics
It is useful to implicitly dene a variable Y t (a function of the exogenous distur-
bances), as the solution to the equation
UY (Y

t ; 1; 
d
t ; t) +  
0zY (Y t ; 
d
t ; t) = 0 (60)
or alternatively as the output level that maximizes U(Yt; 1; 
d




One can then derive a rst order approximation of the upper bound dynamics for the
variables
t  log tbmt  logmt
xt = log Yt   log bY t
where xt denotes the output gap. We also make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The output subsidy falls short of its ecient level (1    < 1  
 eff (sd)), but 1    is suciently close to 1    eff (sd) for the conclusions of
lemma 3 to be valid. Either sd  0 or if sd < 0 then sd is suciently small
for the conclusions of lemma 1 to hold. In addition, initial price dispersion
 1 is small ( 1 = 0 + O(2)) and the initial commitments are such that
 1; 1 =   2; 1.
We then have the following result:
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Proposition 1 Suppose assumption 1 holds. The rst order conditions (48)-(53)
and the constraints in (46) imply (to rst order)
t = Ett+1 + xt + ut (61)
0 = t +  (xt   xt 1) + m bmt (62)bmt = m (t   Et 1t) + q(bqut   Et 1bqut ): (63)
where the constants (; ; m; ; m; q) are functions of the deep model parameters
(explicit expression are provided in appendix A.4) with  > 0;  > 0;  > 0; m >
0; m > 0. Furthermore,
q > 0 if s
d > 0
q < 0 if s
d < 0
In the limiting case without robustness concerns ( ! 1), we have m ! 0 and
q ! 0.
Equation (63) shows that the worst-case belief distortions are of the kind that
they increase the likelihood of positive ination surprises. Intuitively, overweighing
positive ination surprises (and underweighing negative ones) increases average ex-
pected ination and thereby via (61) current ination rates, which contributes (ceteris
paribus) to reducing output, which due to 1    < 1    eff (sd) is already below its
optimal level (given the assumed housing subsidy). In the presence of a housing sub-
sidy (sd > 0) worst case beliefs also overweigh positive housing price suprises (and
underweigh negative ones). Doing so increases increases the expected value of future
housing prices, thereby the average house price today, see the asset pricing equation
(21), which in turn increases housing supply. The latter is harmful in welfare terms
because the presence of an housing subsidy implies that the housing stock is already
suboptimally high.
The proof of proposition 1 also shows that to rst order
bqut = bdt ; (64)
so that bqut = log qut = log q is determined (to this order of approximation) purely by
exogenous disturbances. Importantly, this does not mean that endogenous belief
distortions have no consequences for the marginal-utility value of housing, only that
these eects are of second order in the amplitude of the exogenous disturbances, in
our local approximation. Such second-order eects remain welfare-relevant, since our
log-linear approximation to the optimal policy rule depends on second-order terms
in a local approximation to the expected utility of the representative household, see
Benigno and Woodford (2005) for discussion of this general issue.13
13In Adam and Woodford (2012), belief distortions similarly have no eect on a log-linear approx-
imation to the aggregate supply tradeo (given as usual by the \New Keynesian Phillips curve");
yet the second-order eects of belief distortions on this relationship explain why in that model, a
robustly optimal policy commitment requires dierent ination dynamics than an optimal policy
commitment under rational expectations, even to a log-linear approximation.
21
We are particularly interested in the analyzing eects of shocks origniating in the
housing sector, i.e., the disturbances Ad and 
d
. The following result determines their
eects on the `cost-push' disturbance ut:
Proposition 2 Suppose sd is not too negative, so that lemma 1 holds. Then (to rst
order)
ut = u
bdt + bAdt+ n:h:s:
where n:h:s: denotes the eects of non-housing shocks and the constant u is a func-
tion of deep model parameters (an explicit expression is derived in appendix A.5).
At the ecient steady state where sd = 0 and  =  eff (0) we have u = 0. In the
presence of a housing subsidy (sd > 0) and for  suciently close to  eff (sd), we have
u < 0. while with a housing tax (s
d < 0) and for  suciently close to  eff (sd);we
have u > 0.
The proof of the proposition can be found in appendix A.5. The proposition shows
that cost-push eects are absent (to rst order) whenever the steady state is rst best.
In the presence of a housing subsidy or tax, however, housing demand shocks and
shocks to the productivity of housing production give both rise to cost-push eects,
with the sign of the eect depending on the sign of the housing subsidy sd.
5.3 Impulse Responses to Housing Sector Shocks
We now derive a closed form solution for the impulse response to housing sector
disturbances implied by the upper bound dynamics. For simplicity we assume that
the evolution of the disturbances is described by
bdt = bdt 1 + !tbAdt = A bAdt + !At
where i 2 [0; 1) captures the persistence of the disturbance and !it is an iid innova-
tion (i = ; A).
Substituting (63) and (64) into (62) to eliminate bmt and bqut , and using (61) to









( (Ett+1   Et 1t) + t 1 + ut   ut 1)
+ mm (t   Et 1t) + mq
bdt   Et 1edt ; (65)
which characterizes the ination response to exogenous shocks with cost-push eects,
under the upper-bound dynamics. For a housing sector shock hitting the economy in
period t0 , i.e., for
ut0 = u!t0 or ut0 = u!At0 ,
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and an economy starting out in t0   1 at its deterministic steady state and with no









(t+1 + t 1 + ut   ut 1) for t > t0 (66)

































As shown in Adam and Woodford (2012), equation (66) has for t > t0 a unique
stable solution given by
t = at 1 + biut 1 (69)
where a 2 (0; 1) and bi =  (1   i)a < 0 with a; bi (i = ; A) being independent of
the policymakers' concern for robustness . Combining (69) for t = t0 + 1 with (67)































   a > 0. From proposition 1 follows that in the limiting case
without robustness concerns ( ! 1) we have m ! 0 and q ! 0, so that the
impulses reponses to housing demand and productivity shocks are identical, provided
both shocks have the same persistence. Moreover, under the optimal response the
price level returns to its initial starting value.
In the presence of a housing subsidy (sd > 0) and with robustness concerns we
have q > 0, so that the initial ination response is dampened compared to the
case with rational expectations optimal policy, so that in the long-run the price level
undershoots its initial level following positive disturbances. The dampening and
undershooting eects are thereby more pronounced for the housing demand shock.




we have q < 0. Following a positive
disturbance, ination thus optimally increases more in the initial period than under
rational expectations optimal policy. As a result, the price level will not fully return
and stay at an elevated level. The initial and terminal increase is thereby more
pronounced following a demand disturbance.
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For sd > 0 ( sd < 0) the response to housing demand shocks is dampenend (am-
plied) more by robustness concerns relative to the response to housing technology
shocks. This occurs because housing demand shocks show up (to rst order) in the
asset pricing equation, while housing productivity shock do not.
5.4 The Case of Inelastic Housing Supply
Equation (63) shows that in the presence of a housing subsidy (sd > 0), worst case
beliefs increase the likelihood of future positive surprises to housing prices while
decreasing the probability of negative surprises. Worst case beliefs thus increase,
via the asset price equation (21), current house prices and thereby lead to a further
upward distortion of housing supply (an eect that is of second order).
These eects depend on the presence of an elastic supply of housing in response
to relative price changes. We can consider the limiting case of an inelastic housing
supply (e! 0) by xing an exogenous stochastic process for eAdt = Adt =e. All of our
previous equations then remain well-behaved in this limit, if written in terms of e eAdt
rather than Adt .
In the limit with e = 0, zero resources are used to produce houses (kt = 0), housing
supply is equal to eAdt , and the housing stock therefore independent of agents' beliefs.
Equation (23) then holds for 
 = 0, and the utility function (39) becomes independent
of qu. Similarly, the function f(Yt; q
u
t ; T ) becomes independent of q
u
t , so that equation
(59) implies that 	 = 0. From equation (117) in the appendix it then follows that
q = 0, so that worst case belief distortions become independent of house price
surprises. Since 
 = 0, it follows from equation (131) in the appendix that u = 0,
so that housing sector shocks no longer have cost-push eects. One can then show
that the upper bound dynamics for ination and the output gap are independent of
both types of housing shocks; in fact they depend on other fundamental disturbances
in exactly the same way as in the model without a housing sector analyzed in Adam
and Woodford (2012). In this case, the robustly optimal conduct of policy requires
no reference to housing prices or other housing variables.
6 A Robustly Optimal Target Criterion for Mon-
etary Policy
It remains to be shown that the lower bound for welfare associated with the upper-
bound dynamics characterized in the previous section can in fact be achieved by some
policy rule. This requires not only that we nd a policy rule consistent with the upper-
bound dynamics in the case of the worst-case belief distortions also characterized
above, but also that we can show that these distorted beliefs are indeed worst-case
belief distortions in the case of that policy rule. In fact, not only is it possible to
nd such a rule, but there are many of them, for the same reasons as are explored
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in Adam and Woodford (2012) in the case of the model without a housing sector.
Indeed, our analysis here is a direct extension of our results in the earlier paper. The
only important new work required here is the modication of our derivations of the
policy rules consistent with the upper-bound dynamics, showing the way in which the
policy rules must be modied because of the additional complications in the model.
As in Adam and Woodford (2012), it is of particular interest to note that ro-
bustly optimal monetary policy can be specied in terms of a target criterion | a
log-linear relationship among endogenous variables that the central bank commits
itself to maintain at all times (regardless of the evolution of exogenous disturbances),
through appropriate adjustment of its policy instrument (here, a short-term nom-
inal interest rate). As in the case of optimal policy commitments under rational
expectations, analyzed under general conditions in Giannoni and Woodford (2010),
the robustly optimal target criterion can be derived from the rst-order conditions
that characterize the upper-bound dynamics, in a way that is independent of the
specication of the exogenous disturbance processes.
Substituting (63) into (62) to eliminate bmt; we obtain
t + x (xt   xt 1) + s (t   Et 1t) + q(bqut   Et 1bqut ) = 0; (72)
where x  = > 0; s  mm= > 0 and q  mq=, so that q > 0 if
sd > 0 and q < 0 if s
d < 0. Condition (72) makes no explicit reference to belief
distortions or to exogenous disturbances, except insofar as the latter are involved in
the denitions of xt and bqut .
This condition provides a target criterion that represents a possible form of mon-
etary policy commitment, as established by the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose assumption 1 holds and suppose that the central bank com-
mits to use interest rate policy to ensure that (72) holds each period. Then for any
belief distortions fmt+1g1t=0 close enough to the distortions fmubt+1g1t=0 associated with
the upper bound dynamics (and characterized to rst order in proposition 1), there
exist equilibrium paths for all endogenous variables for which (72) holds each period
(so that the policy commitment is feasible). Moreover, the equilibrium paths are lo-
cally unique, so that the target criterion (72) fully determines the necessary policy
actions.
The proof of the previous result is in appendix A.6. The same appendix also
establishes that condition (72) is indeed the robustly optimal target criterion that we
seek:
Proposition 4 The belief distortion fmubt+1g1t=0 and the associated paths for the en-
dogenous variables (equal to rst order to the dynamics characterized in proposition
1) represent a local solution to the inner problem on the left-hand side of (4); that
is, the distortions fmubt+1g1t=0 represent (locally) worst-case beliefs under the policy
(72), and the associated worst-case outcomes are those characterized (to rst order)
in proposition 1.
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Note that (72) is a form of \exible ination-targeting rule": it implies a denite
long-run average ination rate (namely, zero) regardless of the history of disturbances,
and allows transitory departures of the actual ination rate from that long-run tar-
get only to the extent that they are justied by the sign and magnitude of transitory
variations in the output gap xt and/or the housing price bqut . Moreover, in the limiting
case of no concern for robustness to possible departures from model-consistent beliefs
( !1), we have s ! 0 and q ! 0, in which case the criterion (72) reduces to the
optimal target criterion for the basic New Keynesian model under rational expecta-
tions and without a housing sector, as discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2005) and
Giannoni and Woodford (2010). In particular, under rational expectations, expected
utility can be maximized by committing to a target criterion
t + x (xt   xt 1) = 0; (73)
that can be stated purely in terms of the paths of ination and the output gap, without
any reference to the behavior of housing prices, even in our model with a housing
sector subject to tax distortions. Robustness to belief distortions instead requires a
more complex rule with two additional terms, one of which involves surprise changes
in ination an the other suprise changes in the index of housing prices (measured
in marginal-utility units). The terms involving surprise changes in ination also
appeared in the the robustly optimal target criterion derived Adam and Woodford
(2012) in the case of a New Keynesian model without a housing sector. The new
term arising from robustness concerns in our model with housing is thus the term
involving housing price surprises.
The case of empirical relevance for economies like the US is the one in which there
is overproduction of housing owing to tax subsidies (sd > 0), so that the robustly
optimal target criterion involves q > 0: This means that the central bank should
\lean against" unexpected increases in housing prices, in the sense that it adopts a
policy stance under which it deliberately undershoots its normal targets for ination
and/or the output gap because of an unexpected rise in housing prices.
7 Belief Distortions and Stabilization Goals
Further insight into the way in which robustly optimal policy should respond to
housing variables can be obtained through an explicit consideration of the way in
which welfare is aected by variations in the ination rate, real activity, and housing
prices.
In the basic New Keynesian model, without a housing sector, it is well known
that the expected utility of the representative household can be approximated by a
quadratic objective function, that varies negatively with a discounted sum of squared
ination rates and squared output gaps.14 This result makes it natural to express the
14The approximation consists of a second order Taylor series approximation, valid in the case of
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target criterion for optimal policy in terms of those same two variables, the ination
rate and the output gap.15 Here we show how such a quadratic approximation is
modied by the introduction of a housing sector, in order to obtain insight into the
way in which the robustly optimal target criterion must be modied.
We begin by observing that in the case of small enough exogenous disturbances,
small enough belief distortions, and small enough departures of endogenous variables
from their steady state values, the period contribution to the welfare objective (39)
can be locally approximated by
U(Yt;t; q
u
t ; t) = UY eYt + U et + Uq qut   dt+ 12UY Y eY 2t
+ eYtUY et + UY qedt+ t:i:p:+O(3); (74)
where eYt = Yt  Y , et = t , et = t   , edt = dt   d denote the deviation from
the steady state values of each variable, t:i:p: denotes terms which are independent
of policy (constants and exogenous disturbances), and O(3) indicates a residual that
is at most of third order in the amplitude of the disturbances.16
The terms labeled t:i:p: need not be written out explicitly, as their value will be
independent of monetary policy and of the nature of belief distortions, so that these
terms aect none of the comparison made below. In writing (74), we restrict attention
to possible paths for the economy in which uctuations in the endogenous variableeYt are of a magnitude proportional to that of the exogenous disturbances edt ("of rst
order", in our terminology), and the uctuations in the endogenous variables et,
(qut   
d
t ) are of a magnitude proportional to that of squared disturbance terms ("of
second order"). These bounds on the magnitude of uctuations in the endogenous
variables hold for the solution of the upper bound dynamics characterized in sections
4 and 5, given initial conditions satisfying assumption 1.
One can similarly show that the worst-case belief distortions associated with these
dynamics will be such that emt+1 = mt+1   1 is of rst order as well; in fact, only
uctuations femt+1g1t=0 of rst order will be consistent with a nite relative entropy
bound, and so in our local approximations we assume that emt+1 is of rst order.
The fact that belief distortions can only be of rst order in the amplitude of the
disturbances then implies that the discrepancy qut  
d
t can be at most of second order
in the amplitude of the disturbances (as a consequence of (21)). This is why it is
small enough exogenous disturbances, see chapter 6 in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford
(2003).
15In fact, the appropriate denition of the output gap is precisely the one required in order to
express the quadratic approximation to expected utility in terms of squared ination terms and
squared output gaps.
16See chapter 6 in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003) for further discusssion of
the method of linear-quadratic approximation of optimal policy problems used here.
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and edt , rather than powers of qut  q
alone.17
Again under the assumption of initial conditions satisfying assumption 1, a second
order Taylor approximation to the dynamic equation (44) implies that18
1X
t=0
t et =  1X
t=0






(1  )(1  )(1 + !)(1 + !) > 0:
Using this to approximate the discounted sums of et terms, one can then approximate
the welfare objective (39) by a discounted sum of squared ination rates (as in (75)),
a discounted sum of terms that are quadratic functions of eYt and the exogenous





UY eYt + Uq qut   dti : (76)
From lemma 3, if there is no housing subsidy (sd = 0), then Uq = 0. If in addition,
there is an ecient output subsidy ( =  eff (0)), by lemma 2, UY = 0. In this case,


















 =  U > 0
x =  1
2
Y 2UY Y > 0;
and
xt = log(Yt=Y ) + (Y UY Y )
 1

UY et + UY qedt : (78)
Thus we would obtain in this case the same form of loss function for monetary sta-
bilization policy as in chapter 6 in Woodford (2003).
17We do not need to include a eYt(qut   dt ) term, as this would be of at least third order, though
we do have to inlcude a eYtet term.
18See equation (25) in Benigno and Woodford (2005).
19The rst inequality below follows from (40), which implies U < 0. The second inequality
follows from the fact that UY Y < 0, as shown in appendix A.2.
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Because the approximate welfare objective (77) then contains only purely quadratic
terms, a second order approximation to welfare requires only a rst order accurate
solution for the evolution of ination and output, and so to this order of approxima-
tion, there will be no eects of belief distortions on welfare. The characterization of
optimal policy is then identical (to rst order) to that under rational expectations,
given for example in chapter 7 in Woodford (2003).
Belief distortion can matter to rst order for the form of robustly optimal policy
only to the extent that UY or Uq is non-zero. If the output subsidy falls short of its
ecient level, in accordance with assumption 1, then UY > 0. In this case, a second
order accurate solution for the evolution of eYt is necessary in order to evaluate welfare
to second order, and belief distortions matter. Specically, belief distortions that
exaggerate expected ination shift the Phillips curve trade-o between ination and
output gap stabilization in an unfavorable direction, requiring a lower average value
of eYt for ination stabilization, in a situation where output is already suboptimally
low. Robustly optimal policy must then make it more dicult for near-rational belief
distortions to exaggerate the expected ination rate of ination, as discussed in Adam
and Woodford (2012). However, in the absence of a housing subsidy (sd = 0), we
would still have Uq = 0. In this case, the fact that mistaken beliefs may distort the
housing price qut is irrelevant for welfare (to second order), and the optimal target
criterion continues to take the same form as that derived by Adam and Woodford
(2012) for an economy without a housing market.
If instead housing is subsidized (sd > 0), lemma 3 implies Uq < 0. In this case,
rst-order belief distortions can cause second order variation in qut and so lower wel-
fare. Robustly optimal policy must then seek to guard both against belief distortions
that exaggerate expected ination and those that exaggerate the expected future
value of housing.
The impact of these two types of belief distortions on welfare can be seen by using
quadratic approximations to the model structural equations to solve for the linear
terms in (76) as explicit functions of the belief distortions and variables independent
of belief distortions. We begin, as in Benigno and Woodford (2005), by using a
second-order approximation to the structural equations to eliminate the linear termseYt.










zY eYt + zq(qut   dt ) + 12zY Y eY 2t + eYt







1 emt+1t+1 + 22t+1+  110 +  13 (0)2 + t:i:p:+O(3) (79)




3 > 0 are dened in the appendix. Structural equations
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(42)-(43) imply that the left-hand side of (79) must equal zero in any DEE; hence the
right-hand side must also equal zero to second order. We can thus add these terms
to our second order approximation to the welfare objective and still have a second
order approximation to (39) that must apply to any DEE.
Because the optimal steady state around which we compute our second order
approximation satises UY +  
0zY = 0 (see equation (48)), the terms linear in eYt























2 + t:i:p:+O(3); (80)
where now
   U +  12 > 0
x   1
2
Y 2 (UY Y +  
0zY Y ) > 0
(generalizing the expressions given above to the case in which   6= 0), and xt is
dened as in section 5.2 (generalizing the expression given (78)). Appendix A.2
shows UY Y < 0 as long as the degree to which the output subsidy falls short of its
ecient level is not too great. The same condition guarantees that the term  0zY Y
will be close to zero, so that in this case we must again have x > 0.
The maximization of expected discounted utility then corresponds (to a second
order approximation ) to minimization of a discounted sum of losses of four types:
squared ination rates, squared output gaps, and two types of expectational errors.
The losses due to expectational errors are terms proportional to
Et emt+1t+1 = bEtt+1   Ett+1 (81)














Higher values of the former terms reduce welfare to the extent that  1 > 0, which
holds if and only if the output subsidy is ineciently low, by lemma 2. Higher values
of the latter terms reduce welfare to the extent that 	 < 0, which holds if housing is
subsidized and the ineciency of the output subsidy is not too extreme, by lemma
3. As discussed above, belief distortion have no eects (to second order) on the 2t
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and x2t terms, so they matter for welfare only through their consequences for the
expectational error terms (the ones proportional to expressions (81) and (82)).
We can further simplify (82), writing it in terms of one-period-ahead forecast
errors, as in (81). It follows from (21) that
qut = 
d






= dt + (1  )Et
 emt+1qut+1+ (1  )Et qut+1 ;

















from which it is evident that the excess valuation qut  
d
t is of second order, as asserted
above.
















t+1 emt+1equt+1   1   E0
1X
t=0







t+1 emt+1equt+1   1   qu0   dt : (85)
To second order, we can also write20
emt+1equt+1 = d bmt+1bqut+1 +O(3); (86)
and similarly emt+1t+1 = bmt+1t+1 +O(3): (87)





























20This follows from emt+1 = bmt+1 +O(2) and equt+1 = dbqut+1 +O(3).
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where
%   01 > 0
%q   (1  )	d > 0;
and where the asserted signs for hold % and %q hold under the conditions stated in
assumption 1.
Finally, suppose that the central bank must choose a policy for dates t  0 that
will ensure a particular value for the quantity  0 1(Z0)+	 1(1  )qu0 , as assumed
in the upper bound problem (46) in section 4, where the values of the multipliers
  1 and 	 1 are chosen in a particular way (as functions of the history of shocks
through period  1) so as to give the robustly optimal policy commitment a time-
invariant form. We further suppose that   1 = (1 + e{ 1)  for some scalar e{ 1 and
that 	 1 = 	 + e	 1, where e{ 1 and e	 1 are of rst order in the amplitude of the
exogenous disturbances.21 We show in Appendix A.7 that under these assumptions
 0 1(Z0) + 	 1(1  )qu0 =  (1 + { 1) 110 +  1 (2   3 ) 20
+ (1  )	(qu0   
d
0) + t:i:p:+O(3): (89)
Since this expression must be independent of the policy decisions and of the belief







0   (1  )	(qu0   
d
0) =  e{ 1%0 +  1220 + t:i:p:+O(3):
Substituting this into (88), we nd that maximization of (39) is equivalent to second










t + % bmt+1t+1 + %q bmt+1bqut 
 e{ 1%0 +  1220 + t:i:p:+O(3): (90)
Moreover, (90) can be evaluated to second order on the basis of a rst order solution
for the dynamics of ft; xtg1t=0, for any rst order belief distortions fbmt+1g1t=0. Hence
all that matters about the initial pre-commitment for the problem of constrained
minimization of (90) is the constraint that it places on the rst order approximate
dynamics of ination and the output gap. A rst order approximation to (89) is
simply
 0 1(Z0) + 	 1(1  )qu0 =   10 + t:i:p:+O(2);
21One can show that the multipliers required in order for these initial precommitmenst to lead to
the selection of a robustly optimal policy commitment at some date to continue the robustly optimal
commitment solution chosen at an earlier date will satisfy these properties. Note that in the solution
to the upper bound problem stated in section 4,  t = (1 +e{t)  for all t, and e{ = O(1);	t = O(1)
for all t.
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so that to this order of approximation, the initial pre-commitment can be written in
the form
0 = 0; (91)
where 0 may depend on the history of shocks through period  1, but is independent
of the policy chosen for periods t  0 and of the belief distortions.
Given constraint (91), the 0 and (0)
2 terms in (90) can also be subsumed among
the "t:i:p:" terms. Hence maximization of (39) is equivalent (to second order) to










t + % bmt+1t+1 + %q bmt+1bqut  : (92)
This approximation to the central bank's objective function makes it clear in what
sense policy should seek to reduce the extent to which over-estimates of either fu-
ture ination of future housing prices can occur as a result of "near-rational" belief
distortions.










t+1 bm2t+1| {z }
 V (bm)
+O(3) (93)
A linear quadratic approximation to the robustly optimal policy problem is then given
by the problem
minbc2 bC maxbm2cM (bc; bm) + V (bm) (94)
where cM is the set of processes fbmt+1g1t=0 such that Et bmt+1 = 0 at all times and V (bm)
is nite; bC is the class of linear policy rules bc such that the log-linearized Phillips
curves (61) have a solution ft; xtg1t=0; and (bc; bm) is the value of the loss function
(92) evaluated for the processes ft; xtg1t=0 determined by the policy bc and the belief
distortions bm. The linear policy bc solving (94) provides a linear approximation to the
robustly optimal policy for the exact, nonlinear model.
The linear quadratic approximate problem (94) is simpler than the exact problem
(3) in a number of respects. Notably, a rst-order accurate approximation to the
paths ft; xtg1t=0 under any policy suces in order to evaluate (92) to second order,
under any belief distortion process fbmt+1g1t=0 of rst order. This means that we can
- without loss of generality - restrict attention to linear policy rules bc, and approxi-
mate the equilibrium dynamics implied by any policy commitment by the solution to
the linearized structural equations (61). Hence the equilibrium dynamics ft; xtg1t=0
associated with a given policy are, to this order of approximation, independent of the
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belief distortions bm. This makes it possible to replace the outer problem in (94) by a
direct choice of the equilibrium paths ft; xtg1t=0. We can thus alternatively consider
the problem
minbx2 bX maxbm2cM L(bx; bm)  V (bm); (95)
where bX is the set of processes bx = ft; xtg1t=0 (specied as linear functions of the








and that are consistent with the structural relations (61) and the initial pre-commitment
(91); and L(bx; bm) is the value of (92) for the processes bx and bm.
An advantage of this approximate problem is that it is possible to directly solve
the inner problem for arbitrary outcome processes ft; xtg1t=0, and using this result
to directly solve for the equilibrium outcomes bx under a robustly optimal policy
commitment, rather than having to characterize upper bound dynamics (as in sections
4 and 5) and then show that the upper bound can be achieved. The inner problem
in (95) reduces simply to the choice of a random variable bmt+1 looking ahead from
any date t  0, so as to minimize
Et% bmt+1t+1 + %qEt bmt+1bqut   12Et bmt+1;
subject to Et bmt+1 = 0 and taking as given the conditional distributions for ft; bqut g1t=0.22
The solution to this problem is obviously given by (63), where
m = %= and q = %q=. (96)
It then follows immediately from (96) that m and q have the signs indicated in
proposition 1.
It is also easily seen that the rst order conditions for the outer problem in (95)
are given by (62)23, where bmt is the worst-case belief distortion in the case of the
outcomes chosen in the outer problem; the envelope theorem allow us to treat the
process bm as given when computing these rst order conditions, even though bm is
no longer chosen rst, as in the upper-bound problem. Hence the solution to the
approximate problem (95) is given by the solution to equations (61)-(63), the same
22The solution for bqut is determined to rst order by exogenous disturbances, and the solution
for t is determined to rst order by monetary policy and the exogenous disturbances; both are
determined to rst order independently of belief distortions.
23More precisely, we obtain (62) for all t  1 as a necessary condition for optimality. The rst
order condition for t = 0 is of a dierent form, but implies that (62) also holds for t = 0 under an
appropriate choice for { 1. This is the form of pre-commitment required in order for the robustly
optimal policy rule to have a time-invariant form.
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as our characterization in proposition 1 of the local approximation to the upper bound
dynamics. In terms of the coecients of the loss function (92), we observe that the
coecients in (62) are given up to an arbitrary multiplicative factor by
 =  > 0,  =
x





Alternatively, we can obtain an objective function for the central bank by explicitly
solving for the maximized value of (92), substituting the worst-case belief distortions

















wt+1 = %t+1 + %qbqut+1.
The outer problem in (95) can then be equivalently stated as the choice of pro-
cesses ft; xtg1t=0 consistent with the structural relations (61) and the initial pre-
commitment (91), so as to minimize the quadratic loss function (97), given the process
fbqut g1t=0 that (to rst order) is determined by exogenous housing demand disturbances.
A concern for robustness to possible belief distortions, i.e., a nite value for ,
therefore requires the central bank to seek to minimize the variance of surprise vari-
ations in the composite variable wt+1, in addition to its usual stabilization objectives
(minimization of the squared ination and output gap terms). The reason is that
greater surprise variability in this variable makes it easier for the private sector to
maker larger errors in its estimated of the conditional mean of this variable; an a
higher average value of bEtwt+1 is the type of expectations error that reduces welfare,
as can be seen from (92).
The variance of surprise variations in wt+1 depends not only on the variance of
ination surprises, but also on the correlation of ination surprises with housing price
surprises. Reductions of the distortions associated with worst-case belief distortions
requires that the covariance of ination surprises with housing price surprises be
reduced (or even be negative); hence the robustly optimal policy involves "leaning
against" housing price surprises, as concluded in section 6.
8 Conclusion
Monetary policymakers concerned about whether private-sector expectations will nec-
essarily coincide with those implied by their own model, that they use to understand
the economy and choose their policy commitment, may nd it desirable to include
housing prices in the set of variables that they must track in order to verify that policy
is on course, alongside the traditional \target variables" of ination and a suitably
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dened measure of the output gap. This can be the case even under circumstances
where an optimal policy commitment could be formulated purely in terms of a de-
sired relationship between the paths of ination and the output gap, if one could be
condent that one's policy would result in a rational-expectations equilibrium. We
have illustrated this in the context of a standard New Keynesian model extended to
include a housing sector, where we nd that robustly optimal policy can be charac-
terized by a linear \target criterion," but this must involve housing price surprises in
addition to the paths of ination and the output gap. In the presence of a housing
subsidy, this requires monetary policy to be tighter (less tight) following unexpected
increases (decreases) in the housing price than in the case in which the policymaker
can rely on the private sector to have the same expectations as herself.
Of course, our analysis does not pretend to provide a complete analysis of the
problem of the desirable policy response to housing booms and busts. In our simple
model, mis-pricing of housing due to expectational errors matters for welfare only
because of its consequences for the degree to which productive resources are drawn
into the housing sector; hence the dependence of our results on the degree to which
there is already an inecient over-supply of housing in the steady state, owing to
housing subsidies. We believe that this is one reason why housing booms are harm-
ful, but it probably is not the only one. Central banks' concern to \lean against"
housing booms is often based on the fear that both household and bank balance sheets
may be impaired in the event of a subsequent collapse of housing prices, as a result
of the increased household borrowing often observed during a housing boom. Our
model does not address this issue, as for simplicity we abstract both from household
borrowing and from the existence of banks. The exercise must therefore be viewed
more as an illustration of our proposed approach than as a complete treatment of a
policy issue. It should, however, suce to indicate that conclusions about the need
to include asset prices among the target variables based on a rational-expectations
analysis need not be robust to an allowance for even modest departures from rational
expectations.
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A Appendix
A.1 Steady State Results
This appendix proves a number of claims made in section 5.1. Using (31) and (32)







(1  ) C ~ 1C  Y ; qu;  ~ 1 : (98)
Since the left-hand side is increasing and the right-hand side decreasing in Y (as
CY > 0), there is a unique value for Y solving this equation, as claimed.
Using the denitions of k and f and (98), we have
fY = (1  ) C ~ 1C(Y; qu; ) e 1






(1 + !)Y !
= (1 + !)(1  ) C ~ 1C  Y ; qu;  ~ 1 ;
so that from CY > 0 and ! > 0 we get
kY   fY = (1  ) C ~ 1C
 
Y ; qu; 
 ~ 1
  ! + e 1Y C(Y; qu; ) 1CY (Y; qu; )
> 0: (99)
From (40) we get
UY (Yt;t; q
u































 1 1CY (Yt; qut ; t):
(100)
Using (98), 1 + ! = (1 + ) and evaluating at the steady state we have
UY (Y ; 1; q
u; ) = C
~ 1
C(Y ; qu; ) ~
 1
CY (Y ; q
u; )
     1













C(Y ; qu; )
~
1 ~ ~
 1 1CY (Y ; qu; ):
38
Using the fact that at the steady state
CY
 






1 eC(Y ; qu; ) e 11 e 1
(101)
and (24) we have
UY (Y ; 1; q
u; ) =C
~ 1
C(Y ; qu; ) ~
 1
CY (Y ; q
u; )
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     1

(1  ) + s
d
1 + sd





The ecient output subsidy 1   eff (sd) is the one giving rise to UY (Y ; 1; qu; ) = 0
and is implicitly dened as
1   eff (sd) = 
   1
 


















1 eC(Y ; qu; ) e
 1
1 e 1 > 0 follows that @  1   eff (sd) =@sd < 0. Using (101)
we can express the terms in the last parenthesis in (102), which determine the sign
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1 eC(Y ; qu; ) e 11 e 1
: (103)









1 eC(Y ; qu; ) e 11 e 1
2CY (Y ; qu; ) @Y@(1  )
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and is strictly negative because CY > 0 and because (98) implies
@Y
@(1 ) > 0. Since
UY = 0 for  = 
eff (sd) this shows that UY < 0 whenever 1    > 1    eff (sd) and
UY > 0 whenever 1   < 1  (sd), as claimed in lemma 2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We establish the claim for the case of an ecient output subsidy. By continuity it
also holds for values of 1   suciently close to 1   eff (sd). We have
UY (Yt;t; q
u































 1 1CY (Yt; qut ; t):
(104)
Dierentiating once more w.r.t. Yt and evaluating at the steady state, one obtains
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The rst term in the last expression is negative. Form CY > 0 follows that UY Y < 0
whenever C0 < 0. Simplifying terms we have
C0 =  ~ 1 (1 + 













 1) (1 + )
C
(106)
We thus have C0 < 0 and thereby UY Y < 0 if either s
d  0 or sd < 0 but suciently
close to zero, as claimed.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
From (40) we obtain using (24)
Uq(Y ; q
u; ) = C
~ 1
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where  = e 1
1 e
C(Y ; qu; ) e
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. Using this we can
write
Uq(Y ; q
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proving that Uq < 0 for s
d > 0, Uq > 0 for s
d < 0, and Uq = 0 for s
d = 0. For 
suciently close to  eff (sd) we furthermore have from lemma 2 that UY is suciently
close to zero, so that (57) implies that  1 is also suciently to zero, so that from
(59) it follows that 	 has the same sign as Uq, whenever  6=  eff . Furthermore, for
 =  eff we have UY =  1 = 0 and also Uq = 0, so that from (59) we obtain 	 = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
With initial price dispersion satisfying  1 = 0 +O(2) it follows from equation (45)
that  1 = 0+O(2) for all t  0. Furthermore, equations (5) and (21) jointly imply
bqut = bdt +O(2); (108)
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so that bqut is determined to rst order purely by exogenous disturbances.
From 1   < 1   eff (sd) and lemma 2 follows that
 1 > 0:
Furthermore, we have from lemma 3
	 < 0 if sd > 0
	 > 0 if sd < 0:
Using the fact that bt and bqut   bdt are all zero to rst order accuracy, a linearization
of (48) delivers
Y UY Y bYt + UY qet + UY et + Y  0zY Y bYt + 0zY qet + 0zY et + (fY   kY ) e 1t = 0 (109)
whereet = t    and et = t   . Using a rst order approximation to (60) one can
rewrite (109) as e 1t =  xxt (110)
where
x =
Y UY Y + Y  
0zY Y
fY   kY > 0
The last inequality follows from fY   kY < 0, UY Y < 0 and the fact that for 
suciently close to  eff (sd) we have that  0 is approximately zero.
From the proof of proposition 2 in Adam and Woodford (2012) follows that log-
linearization of (49)-(50) delivers





































( bKt   bFt): (112)
Using the previous equation and (110) to substitute for bK   bF and b  in (111) one
obtains the targeting rule (62), where
 = b

1   (1 + !) > 0
m =  1 > 0
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Log-linearization of the constraints (42) and (43) together with (112) delivers (61)
where the `cost-push' disturbance is dened as
ut = et + Y bY t (113)
and
Y =




(kY   fY ) > 0 (114)
 =




(k0   f 0) (115)
The linearization of (52) delivers
 bmt+1 + (Z)e t + K  0D(1) bZt+1 + (1  )	qubqut+1 + (1  )que	t + e t = 0:
Applying the expectations operator Et to the previous equation, subtracting the result
from it, and using  0D(1) =  0 yields
 bmt+1 = K  1  bKt+1   bFt+1   Et  bKt+1   bFt+1  (1  )	qu  bqut+1   Etbqut+1 :





1  (1 + !) > 0 (116)
q =  (1  )

	qu (117)
The sign of q depends on the sign of 	, which can be determined from lemma 3.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
From (113) we have
ut = et + Y bY t
= AdA
d bAdt + ddbdt + Y bY t + n:h:s:; (118)
where n:h:s: denotes the eects of non-housing shocks. From (115) and noting that
the function k() is independent of the housing sector shocks Adt and 
d
t and that the
function f() depends only via qut = bdt +O(2) on bdt , we get
AdA
d bAdt + ddbdt =  (1  ) (1  )(1 + !) 1kfAdAd bAdt







Using (31) we get
fAd =  e 1(1  )C ~ 1Y C e 1 1CAd > 0; (119)
where CAd denotes the derivative of the function C(Y; q
u; ) w.r.t. Ad, evaluated at
the steady state, and where (23) implies CAd < 0. We thus have
AdA
d bAdt + ddbdt =  (1  ) (1  )(1 + !) 1kfAdAd bAdt




t . From (60) we get
UY (Y

t ; 1; 
d






t ; t)  kY (Y t ; t)

= 0
The linear approximation to this w.r.t. Y t and all housing sector shocks delivers
UY Y Y bY t + UY qdbdt + UY AdAd bAdt + UY ddbdt
+ 1(fY Y Y bY t + fY qdbdt + fY AdAd bAdt   kY Y Y bY t ) = 0 + n:h:s:; (120)
where we used the fact that k() is independent of Ad and d, and subsumed the
eects of non-housing shocks into n:h:s: For the special case with an ecient
output subsidy, lemma 2 shows that  1 = 0, so that then
bY t =   1UY Y Y

UY q + UY d


dbdt + UY AdAd bAdt+ n:h:s:;
so that





d bAdt   (1  ) (1  )(1 + !) 1kfqdbdt




(kY   fY )
UY Y

UY q + UY d


dbdt + UY AdAd bAdt
=












(kY   fY )
UY Y
















Due to the way in which qut ; 
d
t and A






(UY q + UY d) = A






We now derive an explicit expression for 
d
, so as to determine its sign. From (99)
we have









Furthermore, lemma 1 insures UY Y < 0, as long as s























~ (1 + )C(Yt; q
u
t ; t)
 e 1CY (Yt; qut ; t): (122)
where  = e 1=(1  e)  1. Taking derivatives w.r.t. qut and dt and evaluating at the
steady state delivers













































































 (1 + )C
< 0 (124)













=   1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)2

 (1 + )C 1CY
CY q =  
1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)2







=   1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)2
 







1 + (+ 1)
C





=   1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)3
(1 + 
















1 e 2CAd + e 11  eC e 11 e 1 11  e 
Ad

=   1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)2







=   1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)2
 
 





 (1 + )C





=   1  g
(1 + 






C2 + C + 
(1 + )C2
1 + 
 (1 + )C

=   (1 + )
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)3
1  g
1  e 
AdC (1 + 
C) :
We thus have
fq =  e 1(1  )Ce 1Y C e 1 1Cq
= e 1(1  )Ce 1Y C e 1 
C






and can furthermore express
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=  ~ 1C ~ 1C ~ 1 1 1  g
1 + 






1 + (+ 1)
C
  C ~ 1C ~ 1 1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)3
(1 + 












1  e (1 + )C e 1 1  g1 + 




~ (1 + )
 
  e 1C e 1 1   1qu 11 e
C+1




 (1 + )C
  Add
~ (1 + )C e 1 1  g
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)3
(1 + 





~ (1 + )C e 1 1  g
1 + 













= qu we can write this as
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  C ~ 1C ~ 1 1
(1 + 
 (1 + )C)3
(1 + 












(1 + )C e 1 1
1 + 

























(1 + )C e 1 (1 + 
C) (1 + ) 
C
(1 + 











(1 + )C e 1 1  e
1 + 



















C) (1 + )
+~ 1
1+sd




























From (105), (98) and 1 + ! = (1 + )we get














 (1 + )C)2
0BB@
 ~ 1 (1 + 
 (1 + )C)
 










(1 + ) 
C






We can thus express
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fq +
(kY   fY )
UY Y
(UY q + UY d)
= e 1(1  )Ce 1Y C e 1 
C


























C0 =  ~ 1 (1 + 











  1) (1 + )
C
=  ~ 1 (1 + 
 (1 + )C) 1
1 + sd
 









  ~ 1 (1 + 
 (1 + )C)  1 + sd + (1 + ) 





  ~ 1 (1 + 
 (1 + )C)2   sd~ 1 (1 + 




and from (126) we get
C1 = ~
 1 1
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
  1
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)3
(1 + 











(1 + ) 
C
(1 + 
C) (1 + )












(1 + ) 
C
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
  (1 + 
C) (1 + ) 1 +
1
1+sd
(1 + ) 
C





(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
(





(1 + ) 
C
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
  (1 + 
C) (1 + ) 1 +
1
1+sd
(1 + ) 
C





(1 + ) (1 + 
C)





(1 + ) 
C
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
+
(1 + ) (1 + 
C)








(1 + ) 
C








1 + sd + (1 + ) 
C
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
+
(1 + ) (1 + 
C)
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2

1  1 + s
d + (1 + ) 
C












(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
  (1 + ) (1 + 
C
)
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)2
sd








(1 + (1 + ) 
C)
+ sd
~ 1 (1 + (1 + ) 
C)  (1 + ) (1 + 
C)





Combining (128), (129) and (130) we have
fq +
(kY   fY )
UY Y
(UY q + UY d)
= e 1(1  )Ce 1Y C e 1 
C



































































! + e 1Y CY
C

(1 + (+ 1)
C)C1























(UY q + UY d)

is identical to the sign of
e 1 !   1










! + e 1Y CY
C

(1 + (+ 1)
C)C1
= e 1  !  1 (1  ) + Y CYC 1 g(1+
(1+)C)2 1
1+sd
  ~ 1 (1 + 
 (1 + )C)2   sd~ 1 (1 + 





! + e 1Y CY
C







(1 + (1 + ) 
C)
+ sd
~ 1 (1 + (1 + ) 
C)  (1 + ) (1 + 
C)
(1 + (1 + ) 
C)3










 ~ 1   sd~ 1 1
1 + 
 (1 + )C
















(1 + (1 + ) 
C)
  sd (1 + ) (1 + 
C
)



























 (1 + )C)2
=  e 1!   1

(1  )  1  g
1 + sd






(1 + (1 + ) 
C)
  (1 + ) (1 + 
C
)











 (1 + )C)2
=  e 1!   1








(1 + (1 + ) 
C)
  !(1  g) s
d
1 + sd
(1 + ) (1 + 
C)











 (1 + )C)2
=  e 1!   1














!(1  g) (1 + ) (1 + 
C
)









1  g 2 (1 + )
C
(1 + 




 (fq + (kY   fY )
UY Y
(UY q + UY d)) = 0 & u = 0 for s
d = 0
 (fq + (kY   fY )
UY Y
(UY q + UY d)) < 0 & u < 0 for s
d > 0
 (fq + (kY   fY )
UY Y
(UY q + UY d)) > 0 & u > 0 for s
d < 0
.
In the special case with sd = 0 we have from (106)
C0 =  ~ 1 (1 + 
 (1 + )C)2 ; (132)
and for sd = 0 we also have, as show below
C1 =
~ 1






(kY   fY )
UY Y
(UY q + UY d)
= e 1(1  )Ce 1Y C e 1 
C






















C ~ 11 + (1 + ) 
C














(1  )  ~ 1Y CY
C
 





(1  )  ~ 1Y CY
C
 















(1  ) +  1  g
 !  1






where the last equality follows from the fact that   1

(1    eff (0)) +  1  g = 0
when the output subsidy is ecient, as has been assumed.
A.6 Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
We start with the proof of proposition 3. From equation (21) follows that the dynam-
ics of bqut are to rst order independent of policy choices and belief distortions (with
the latter being of rst order), so that equations (61) and (72) jointly determine to
rst order a unique path for fxt; tg1t=0. Since the dynamics of t is to rst order
independent of policy decisions and belief distortions, see (44), and since (33) and
(34) determine to rst order Ft and Kt, given the rst order solution for xt and t;
this determines to rst order the dynamics of fqut ; Yt; Ft; Kt;tg1t=0. Under the as-
sumed policy commitment, belief distortions thus aect the evolution of endogenous
variables at most to second order. The second (or higher) order eects of beliefs that
dier slightly from the worst-case beliefs implied by the upper bound dynamics can
be computed using the rst order accurate paths for (which are already determined),
the considered deviations from the worst-case beliefs, and the second (or higher) or-
der approximations to equations (21) and (33)-(45). The interest rate required to
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support this outcome can be determined from equation (41), using the solution for
the other variables.
Next, we establish proposition 4. The problem of choosing worst-case beliefs under

















t ; t) + mt+1(Zt+1)  Zt]
+	t[
d
t + (1  )mt+1qut+1   qut ]
+ t (mt+1   1)
+t
 
t + x (xt   xt 1) + s (t   Et 1t) + q(bqut   Et 1bqut )
377777775
(134)
+  0 1(Z0) + 	 1(1  )qu0 ;
where t can be expressed as a function Ft and Kt using (36). It is clear, that the rst
order conditions of this problem are satised by the upper bound dynamics under
the additional requirement that t = 0 at all times. To show that the upper bound
dynamics are indeed a local minimum to the worst case beliefs problem, we thus
only need to show that second order conditions are also satised at the upper bound
problem.






that we have a locally unique solution for fqut ; Yt; Ft; Kt;tg1t=0. Since the rst order
the dynamics of these variables are independent of belief distortions, the dynamics
of fqut ; Yt; Ft; Kt;tg1t=0 depend to second order at most linearly on the choice of
fmt+1g1t=0. Therefore, to a second order approximation, all terms in (134) depend
only linearly on fmt+1g1t=0, except for E0
P1
t=0 
tmt+1 logmt+1, which is strictly
convex in the distortions. This implies that the second order conditions are indeed
satised at the upper bound solution and the associated worst-case belief distortions,
whenever monetary policy commits to the target criterion (72).
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A.7 Details of the Linear-Quadratic Approximation
We start by deriving the second-order approximation in equation (79):
E0 




0@ zY eYt + zq(qut   dt ) + D(1) eZt+1   eZt
+1
2









where  0 = ( 1;  1) and where we used the fact that K times the Hessian matrix

























and c < 0 whenever steady state output falls short of its rst best level, as then
 1 > 0 (see appendix A.2 in Adam and Woodford (2012) for further details).
A linear approximation to (36) deliversbFt+1   bKt+1 =   
1   (1 + !)t +O(2) (136)
Using this and
a 0D(1) =  0
we can write (135) as
E0 
0 (z(Yt; qut ; t) + mt+1(Zt+1)  Zt)
=E0
26664  0
0@ zY eYt + zq(qut   dt ) +  eZt+1   eZt
+1
2







1  (1 + !)
2





0@ zY eYt + zq(qut   dt ) +  eZt+1   eZt
+1
2
zY Y eY 2t + eYtzY et + zY qedt
1A




where the last line uses the denitions
1 = K







1  (1 + !) (1 + !) > 0
and the fact that K = F at point around which we approximate. Multiplying by t






 eZt+1   eZt =   1F  bF0   bK0 (138)
A second order approximation to (36) allows to express bFt = logFt=F and bKt =
logKt=K in terms of t = logt:
bFt   bKt =   













































1  (1 + !)
(   1)
1   ;
and where the second to last equality uses the denition of 1 and the fact that
F = K in the steady state. Combining (137) with (138) and (140) delivers (79) in
the main text.
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Next, we derive (89):
 0 1(Z0) + 	 1(1  )qu0
= (1 +e{ 1) 0D(1) eZ0 + 1
2
cK
 bF0   bK02 + (1  )	(qu0   d0)
+ t:i:p:+O(3)
= (1 +e{ 1) 1K( bF0   bK0) + 12cK  bF0   bK02 + (1  )	(qu0   d0)
+ t:i:p:+O(3)







1   (1 + !)0
2



























where the third equality uses (136) and (139).
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